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1A Game-theory Analysis
of Charging Stations Selection by EV Drivers
Francesco Malandrino, Claudio Casetti, Carla-Fabiana Chiasserini, and Massimo Reineri
Abstract—We address the problem of Electric Vehicle (EV)
drivers’ assistance through Intelligent Transportation System
(ITS). Drivers of EVs that are low in battery may ask a navigation
service for advice on which charging station to use and which
route to take. A rational driver will follow the received advice,
provided there is no better choice i.e., in game-theory terms, if
such advice corresponds to a Nash-equilibrium strategy. Thus, we
model the problem as a game: first we propose a congestion game,
then a game with congestion-averse utilities, both admitting at
least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The former represents
a practical scenario with a high level of realism, although at a
high computational price. The latter neglects some features of
the real-world scenario but it exhibits very low complexity, and
is shown to provide results that, on average, differ by 16% from
those obtained with the former approach. Furthermore, when
drivers value the trip time most, the average per-EV performance
yielded by the Nash equilibria and the one attained by solving a
centralized optimization problem that minimizes the EV trip time
differ by 15% at most. This is an important result, as minimizing
this quantity implies reduced road traffic congestion and energy
consumption, as well as higher user satisfaction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Any technology touted as environmentally-friendly is likely
to have its place secured on news media around the globe.
Among green solutions, Electric Vehicles (EVs), viewed by
all as emission-free, clean and noiseless, are rapidly rising
in popularity and expectations, also thanks to the predictable
shortage of fossil fuel in the not-so-distant future. Indeed, EV
mass-production and widespread adoption seem all but likely if
some early hurdles are overcome, such as short driving range,
lack of recharging infrastructure and long charging time.
Arguably, any road scenario in ten years’ time will likely
feature some ratio of EVs taking over the streets [1]. Old-
fashioned gas pumps might also be gradually phased out by
public charging stations, with electric outlets popping up in
places such as curbside parking, parking lots and cab stands.
Even in this rosy scenario, one wonders when worries about
vehicle range and availability of charging stations will be lifted
and whether drivers will not be forced to plan their entire
trip or commute around such availability, at least early on in
charging station development. Finally, it is not clear when the
“time consuming” tag will be removed from the task of car
recharging.
Given the above concerns, ICT and Intelligent Transporta-
tion System (ITS) can step in and provide solutions that
alleviate such concerns. Indeed, traditional navigation services
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could be integrated with the information provided by roadside
network infrastructure and on-board user terminals through
wireless communication [2], [3]. A Central Controller (CC)
could collect information on the vehicular traffic conditions
and on the occupancy status of the charging stations through
ITS facilities. Then, EV drivers with low battery level could
send a request to the CC and ask for advice on the specific
charging station to choose and the route to take.
The key point in this scenario, however, is that drivers that
resort to such a navigation service will very likely behave
as self-interested users, who aim at finding the best trade-off
between the trip time (including the time they have to stop at
the charging station) and the charge/change price they pay at
the station. Thus, they will follow the advice provided by the
CC only if they find it advantageous to themselves.
In this work, we show that the advice provided by the CC
may not conform to the interests of EV drivers when it is
obtained by solving a centralized optimization problem that
maximizes the average per-EV utility. We demonstrate instead
that the above requirement is satisfied when the problem is
modeled as a non-cooperative game. Specifically, we resort
to a congestion game [4] and a game with congestion-averse
utilities [5], where the players are the EVs with low battery
level. EVs behave differently from ordinary players of ordinary
games, in that they do not compute their strategy themselves,
but rather follow the CC’s advice. However, as explained
below, the advice EVs received by the CC corresponds to the
choice they would make themselves, had they all the necessary
information.
In both congestion games and congestion-averse games, the
decision to be made concerns the charging station that an EV
should use, along with the route to take passing through such
a station. The two game models exhibit a different level of
realism and complexity; however, for both of them, we show
that, when the CC uses the game solution to provide advice
to the EVs, the following facts hold.
(i) The navigation strategies suggested by the CC corre-
spond to Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategy profiles1, i.e., each
EV finds the suggestion by the CC advantageous to itself and
is willing to adhere to it.
(ii) When drivers value their trip time most, the advice
provided by the CC leads to an average per-EV trip time
that is very close to the minimum obtained by solving a
centralized optimization problem, and much shorter than the
one the drivers can obtain by adopting a greedy approach
(e.g., always select the closest or the least congested charging
1Recall that an NE is a game solution, in which no player can gain anything
by unilaterally changing his own strategy.
2station). This is highly desirable since, shortening the average
per-EV trip time, contributes to reducing road congestion and
energy consumption due to EVs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Sec. II, we discuss previous work highlighting the novelty of
our contribution. The system scenario is introduced in Sec. III,
along with the statement of the problem under study. We
motivate our work in Sec. IV, by showing that centralized
optimal solutions may lead to advice that may not be followed
by the EV drivers. The game-theoretic approach that we adopt
for the problem solution can be found in Sec. V. In Sec. VI,
we introduce the simulation scenario that we use to derive
the results presented in Sec. VII. There, we show the low
complexity of the proposed method and its excellent perfor-
mance. The latter results are derived through the Simulation
for Urban MObility (SUMO) tool [6] and using a real-world
road topology. We draw our conclusions in Sec. VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Recently, both the academic and industrial communities
have devoted a great deal of interest to EVs and to the use
of ITS services in support of EV drivers. As an example,
in [7] Ferreira et al. consider the case where the behavior
of EV drivers, i.e., whether they drive to the closest or the
cheapest charging station, depends on their profile (age or
gender). The authors design a system that, through various
communication technologies, provides EV drivers with several
pieces of information, among which, the locations of charging
stations. The burden of selecting the charging station, however,
is left to the drivers, as the study of the trip time associated
to different alternatives is not within the scope of [7].
An analytical model for the study of the EVs trip time is
presented in [8]. The road topology is modeled as a graph
whose edges are associated with a fixed, i.e., non traffic-
dependent, waiting time. Charging stations are likened to
multi-server queues, and a theoretical lower bound to the
charging time is derived. The model, however, does not include
the availability of a central controller and, unlike our study,
it does not consider that vehicles may deviate from their
originally-planned route in order to reach a suitable charging
station. Thus, the study in [8] does not account for the EV
travel time to and from a charging station. The presence of a
central controller is considered in [9], [10], where the route
of an EV is minimized while accounting for stop-overs at
charging stations. A multi-objective decision-making model is
also presented in [11], where the gas station selection depends
on drivers’ personalized requirements and gasoline price, and
it aims at minimizing travel distance and refuelling price. In
these works, however, individual EV routing and charging are
optimized through standard techniques, and the effect of such
decisions on each other is not taken into account.
The works in [12]–[20] are mostly concerned with the EV
consumption and its impact on the power grid. Indeed, what
is a charging station from the viewpoint of EVs is at the
same time an energy storage station from the viewpoint of
the power grid – a place where surplus energy, produced
during low-demand periods, can be stored for later usage.
In particular, in [14] the authors envision a central controller
that predicts the EVs mobility and advises each EV about
which charging station to use and when, so as to smooth
the power consumption peak. The work in [14], however,
accounts neither for the time that EVs may have to wait in
line at the charging station, nor for the fact that EVs may
act strategically. A fully-distributed mechanism is proposed
in [16], which lets EVs select fast charging stations along a
highway. The mechanism is based on a multi-agent approach
and requires EVs to continuously interact in order to adapt to
each others’ individual decisions. The work in [17] proposes
a family of algorithms that, by regulating the voltage fed
to EVs using different charging stations, aim at minimizing
the load factor, the load variance or the power losses over
the grid. Similarly, the goal of [18] is to ensure that EVs
can obtain the energy they need to recharge their batteries,
without impairing the stability of the power grid. The work
in [18] takes into account the behavior of EV drivers, but it
aims at influencing it by means of monetary incentives. The
study in [19] jointly addresses the optimal power flow and
the EV charging problems. The authors show that the optimal
power flow problem is generally non-convex and non-smooth,
but it can be solved optimally using its convex dual problem
for most practical power networks. In [20], the rate at which
EVs charge is controlled so as to lead to a better utilization
of the power grid. A rather different approach is followed
in [21], in which vehicles are assumed to negotiate day-ahead
charging schedules. The overall objective is to shift the load
due to EVs to fill the overnight electricity demand valley.
On a similar note, the work [22] looks at charging stations
from the viewpoint of the power grid, viewing them as energy
storage stations. The authors envision generating more energy
when the demand is low, and storing it – under the guise
of charged EV batteries – for usage during subsequent, high-
demand periods. We remark, however, that the study of the
impact of EVs on the power grid, although interesting, is not
within the scope of our work. Indeed, properly accounting for
such aspects as the integration of distributed power sources in
the power grid, would require a totally different study [23].
The study in [24] focuses on estimating the battery dis-
charge time. The trips of the EVs are modeled using real
data and traffic statistics, and vehicles are assumed to use
the closest available charging station. Again, the waiting time
at the charging station and the fact that EV drivers may
significantly deviate from their planned route to reach a station
are neglected.
A game-theoretic approach is adopted in [25], whose main
contribution is to provide an analytical framework that is suit-
able for capturing the interactions between charging stations
and EVs. The latter are assumed to act in groups, and need
to decide on their charging profiles. The problem is modeled
as a generalized non-cooperative Stackelberg game, in which
the charging stations act as leaders and the EV groups are
the followers. With respect to this work, we account for the
fact that EVs pursue a trade-off between charge price and trip
time, and that such a trade-off can be vehicle-specific.
At last, we mention that in [26], we presented a preliminary
work that investigates which information is important that
3EV drivers receive through ITS. In particular, we showed the
benefit of transmitting specific suggestions to EV drivers on
which charging station to use with respect to the case where
only mere updates on traffic conditions and charging station
occupancy are provided. The evident advantages brought by
specific advice motivated our present work, which is concerned
about how such advice should be determined. A sketch of this
work with a few preliminary results has been included in [27].
III. SYSTEM SCENARIO AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a road topology including a set of road
segments L and a set of charging stations C. Any ordered
sequence of adjacent segments l ∈ L is said to form a route.
Among all vehicles that travel across the topology, we identify
the following three categories:
(i) non-EVs or EVs with medium-high battery level, which
are not interested in using a charging station;
(ii) EVs whose battery is low, but that will not resort to the
navigation service to identify the charging station;
(iii) EVs with low battery that use the navigation service to
select a charging station.
Note that the vehicles in the first category just contribute to
the traffic intensity over the roads, while those in the last two
categories contribute both to the intensity of vehicular traffic
and to the occupancy of the charging stations. Furthermore,
the fact that vehicles start looking for a charging station when
their battery level becomes low, implies that they will all have
(approximately) the same battery level. We account for all
these types of vehicles and their influence on the effectiveness
of our solution in Sec. VII.
Upon stopping at a charging station, the battery of the
vehicle will be replaced with a fully-charged one. This is
due to the comparatively long charge times in both current
and (conceivably) future technologies [28]. In this case, the
charging station also represents an energy storage station as
defined in Sec. II. Our model also accounts for the fact that
there may not be fully-charged batteries at a station. In this
case, the battery is recharged, in a time which is assumed
to be constant and equal to half an hour [28]. Assuming
a constant recharge time does not account for the fact that
different vehicles may have different battery capacity and
arrive at the station with different battery levels. However,
since batteries are replaced in virtually all cases, the impact of
this assumption on our results is negligible. Charging stations
have a number of replacing stalls (hereinafter servers), possibly
varying from one station to another. Clearly, upon reaching a
charging station, an EV incurs a waiting time that depends on
the occupancy of the station, the service time, the number of
fully-charged batteries available and the number of servers.
Next, we focus on EV drivers that belong to the last
category, i.e., they have got a low battery level and resort to the
navigation service. As mentioned, such EVs can be considered
as self-interested (or, rational) users. Specifically, we assume
that their goal is to pursue a (possibly, user-specific) trade-
off between the trip time and the charge price. This translates
into assuming that drivers consistently act in order to pursue
such an objective – as opposed to, e.g., driving to the charging
station they like better, or to the one where they can collect
bonus points or miles.
In the most general case, such EV drivers may be able to
reach a number of possible charging stations and, for each
of them, they may choose among multiple, different routes.
Therefore, they will ask the advice of the CC to make a
decision on the charging station to use and the route to take,
including their current position and final destination in the
request. It is fair to assume that the CC has knowledge of the
road topology, the traffic conditions, as well as the locations of
the charging stations, their current occupancy and availability
of fully-charged batteries. Also, the CC can collect information
on the position, speed and heading of cars through a real-time
traffic monitoring system, such as those currently implemented
by recent navigation solutions [2], [29]. How the CC gathers
the information is an orthogonal problem with respect to ours;
in general, secure positioning schemes [30] could be employed
to make sure that vehicles do not lie about their positions.
Based on the collected information, the CC indicates to the
EVs which station to use and the route to take. Upon receiving
a response from the CC, all rational EVs that made a request
will be willing to follow the suggestion of the CC if they find it
advantageous, even if they have to deviate from their original
route to reach the charging station suggested by the CC. Note
that EV drivers that are not rational, and eventually decide not
to adhere to the received advice, fall into the second of the
categories mentioned at the beginning of this section.
IV. WHY A GAME MODEL?
A natural choice to solve the problem of selecting the
charging station for each EV, and the corresponding route,
would be to let the CC formulate an optimization problem that
maximizes the EV utility, defined as a function of its trip time
and the charge price2 the driver has to pay. However, it is easy
to show that in general such an approach yields solutions that
EV drivers may find not advantageous to themselves, hence to
which they will not adhere. The same observation holds in the
case where the CC tries to maximize the minimum EV utility.
As an example, consider the EV utility to be represented by
its expected trip time only, and let us focus on the toy scenario
depicted in Fig. 1, where there are two charging stations, ca
and cb, both with one idle server and service time equal to 2
time units. Assume that, at the same time, two EVs, v1 and
v2, have low battery and ask for the help of the navigation
service to select the charging station to use. EV v1 can reach
either ca or cb, but its travel time toward the two stations is 2
and 1 time units, respectively, while from both stations to its
final destination, d1, the travel time is equal to 1 time unit. EV
v2 instead can only
3 head toward cb, with travel time equal to
1.5 time units, and from there it can reach its destination d2
in 1 time unit.
It is easy to verify that, if the CC provides its advice to the
EVs so as to minimize either the average per-EV trip time or
2In the following, we indicate by charge place the price that drivers have
to pay to obtain a fully charged battery, whether by replacing or recharging
their one.
3Indeed, v2 could travel to cb, then to the location of v1, and from there
to ca, but such an option is clearly dominated by choosing cb (see Tab. I).
4v1
v2
ca
cb
d1
d2
2 1
1 1
11.5
Fig. 1. A toy scenario.
the maximum EV expected trip time, then the solution is: v1
heads to ca while v2 uses cb. This would indeed lead to an
average per-EV trip time and a maximum EV expected trip
time equal to 4.75 and 5 time units, respectively4. However,
v1 will not find the advice of the CC advantageous since, by
heading to cb, it would incur a total trip time of 4 time units,
against the trip time of 5 time units it would experience by
following the suggestion of the CC. Thus, v1 will ignore it.
Based on the above observation, we propose a different
approach. We model the problem of selecting the charging
station, and the corresponding route, as a non-cooperative
game, which the CC solves considering as players the EVs
that use the navigation system for advice. Then, we look for
a strategy profile that is an NE and is advantageous from the
viewpoint of the system performance, and we take this as a
solution to the problem. Since in this case the advice by the CC
corresponds to an NE, there is no alternative choice for an EV
that leads to a shorter time to destination, hence self-interested
drivers will adhere to it. For instance, in the example above,
the CC will suggest to both v1 and v2 to use cb, and no one will
deviate from the advice of the CC. It is clear, however, that a
game-theoretic approach does not ensure that the average per-
EV trip time is minimized (e.g., in the above toy scenario it
increases from 4.75 to 5 time units)5. Nevertheless, in Sec. VII
we show that, even in real-word scenarios, the average per-
EV trip time obtained through our game-theoretic approach is
remarkably close to the optimum.
In summary, it is worth stressing that vehicles do not
compute any Nash equilibrium themselves. It is the task of the
CC to issue suggestions that correspond to the most rational
action of each vehicle– even if this comes at some cost in
terms of global optimality, as in the above example. Also,
we remark stress that the game could be solved by the EVs
themselves, provided that they have the required information.
In our case, however, we take a practical perspective and
consider that it is the CC that collects all the information,
processes it and solves the game so as to provide the EV
drivers with the strategy to adopt (i.e., the charging station
to use and the route to take). This implies that the proposed
mechanism neither significantly increases the system overhead
due to communication protocols, nor requires EV drivers to
4If v1 uses ca, its trip time is 2+2+1=5 time units, while the trip time of
v2 is 1.5+2+1=4.5 units. This results in an average per-EV trip time of 4.75
and a maximum EV expected trip time of 5. If instead v1 heads toward cb, it
arrives there first and its trip time becomes 1+2+1=4 units, while v2 finds the
station server occupied by v1, thus its trip time increases to 1.5+1.5+2+1=6.
It follows that the average per-EV trip time and the maximum EV expected
trip time become 5 and 6 time units, respectively.
5In game theory, this concept is related to the price of anarchy (PoA), which
is defined as the ratio of the average per-EV trip time at the equilibrium to
the optimal one.
TABLE I
TRAVEL PLUS WAITING TIMES IN THE TOY EXAMPLE
P
P
P
P
PP
v1
v2 ca cb
ca (5, 9.5) (5, 4.5)
cb (4, 9.5) (4, 6)
Fig. 2. Abstract representation of the vehicular scenario where each EV may
take several different routes to a given charging station and from there to its
intended destination.
exchange sensitive information about themselves, or make any
computation to make a decision.
V. THE RECHARGING GAME
We now detail the game models we use to solve the recharg-
ing problem in the system scenario described in Sec. III.
Assume that the CC processes the requests received from EVs
with low battery every T seconds. We denote the set of EVs
that ask for advice during a T -second time period by N , and
its cardinality by N . The vehicles that resorted to the advice
of the CC in the previous time periods are not considered
as players (e.g., because they do not change their choice), but
their impact on charging times is taken into account by the CC.
Consider the most general case in which each of the N EVs
may reach several charging stations and take different routes to
arrive at a given station, as well as to go from there to its final
destination. For clarity, we depict an abstract representation of
such a scenario in Fig. 2; we will deal with a real-world road
topology and realistic vehicular mobility while deriving the
performance results in Sec. VII.
In the figure, lines connecting vehicles with charging sta-
tions, and the latter with final destinations, represent the
possible road segments that EVs can take to or from the
charging station. The different thickness of the lines denotes
the fact that road segments may be characterized by various
levels of traffic intensity, hence they may imply different travel
times. Clearly, in a more general setting, road segments may
end at any intersection on the map, other than a charging
station or an entry/destination point.
We then consider the N EVs to be the players of a
congestion game [4] (solved by the CC), i.e., a non-cooperative
game, in which players strategically choose from a set of
facilities and derive utilities that depend (in an arbitrary way)
on the congestion level of each facility, i.e., on the number of
players using it. Congestion games are of particular interest to
us since they have been proved [4] to admit at least one pure-
strategy6 NE. Thus, if the CC derives its advice by modeling
6A pure-strategy NE is a deterministic solution, as opposed to a probabilistic
one (e.g., go to charging station cx, rather than go to cx with probability 0.5).
5ηc(nc) =


σ if wc < min{Sc, Bc}
ρ if Bc ≤ wc < Sc
(1− φ)σ +
⌊
wc−Sc
Sc
⌋
σ + σ if Sc ≤ wc < Bc
(1− φ)σ +
⌊
Bc−Sc
Sc
⌋
σ +
⌊
wc−Bc
Sc
⌋
ρ+ ρ if Sc ≤ Bc < wc
Bc
Sc
σ + Sc−Bc
Sc
(1− ψ)ρ+
⌊
Bc−Sc
Sc
⌋
σ +
⌊
wc−Bc
Sc
⌋
ρ+ ρ if wc ≥ Bc ∧Bc < Sc
(2)
the system as a congestion game and finding a solution that
is an NE, then all rational, self-interested EVs will follow the
advice.
A. The Congestion Game
Congestion games [4] are games where the utility of a player
depends on (i) the resources she chooses to utilize, and (ii) how
many other players choose to utilize those resources. For these
games, we are guaranteed [4] that at least one pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium exists.
A congestion game is defined by the 4-tuple
Γ = (N ,F , {Si}, {τl(nl), ηc(nc)}) , (1)
whose elements in our case are as follows.
(a) The set of players, N = {v1, . . . , vN}, which, as
mentioned, correspond to the EVs using the navigation service
and that have asked for the advice of the CC during the past
T seconds.
(b) The set of facilities, F , which is composed of all
possible charging stations and road segments included in the
road topology, i.e.,
F = C ∪ L = {ca, cb, . . . l1, . . . }.
Given F , for each player i ∈ N , a subset Fi ⊆ F can be
identified, including all facilities that EV i can reach and use
on its way to the destination. Clearly, if the road topology is
fully connected, then Fi = F , ∀i ∈ N . Note that considering
the road segments li allows us to account for driver-spcific
travel times.
(c) Denoting by P(Fi) the set of all possible partitions of
Fi, Si ⊆ P(Fi) is the set of viable strategies for EV i, i.e, all
groups of facilities that can be used by i. In our context, each
strategy in Si = {{ca, lia, lai}, {cb, lib, lbi}, . . . } is composed
of:
(i) one of the charging stations that EV i can reach, along
with
(ii) the road segments forming a route that allows i to go
from its current position to the selected charging station
(for brevity, indicated as lia, lib, . . . ), and from there to
its final destination (for brevity, indicated as lai, lbi, . . . ).
(d) For each strategy, there is a cost to pay for each facility
that is used (either a charging station or a road segment).
Such a cost is defined as a function mapping the number nf
of players selecting the facility f onto a time value in R.
Note, however, that congestion games are characterized by the
so-called anonymity property, i.e., the facility cost cannot on
depend the players identity. In our context, we therefore define
the cost of a strategy as the sum of 1) the waiting time and
the service time at the corresponding charging station incurred
by the generic player, 2) the expected travel time on the
associated route, from current road segment to destination, via
the charging station, and 3) the charge price pic at the selected
station, multiplied by the equivalence factor K (expressed in
hour/$) representing how much EV drivers value their time
with respect to money. We denote the first contribution by
ηc(nc), with c ∈ C and nc being the number of players
selecting station c, while we denote the second contribution by∑
l τl(nl), with the l’s being the road segments in the chosen
route and nl the number of players taking segment l. Thus,
the total cost for the strategy, corresponding to the selection
of charging station c, can be written as:
ηc(nc) +
∑
l
τl(nl) +Kpic,
and each player will aim at minimizing such a cost. In
accordance with the scenario detailed in Sec. III, we write
ηc(nc) so as to account for (a) the number of servers at station
c, Sc, (b) the service time, (c) the number of fully-charged
batteries currently available at c, Bc, and (d) the waiting time
before an EV can be served. The quantity wc that appears in
the last three lines of (2), however, deserves a more detailed
explanation.
Before we can write the expression of ηc(nc), we need to
study the expected number of EVs that the generic player
finds at the charging station upon its arrival. This is because
the anonymity property of congestion games forbids player-
specific utilities and payoffs. Such a value is given by
wc = mc + qc + nc (3)
where:
mc is the expected number of non-player EVs that the CC
estimates to be already at the station upon the arrival of the
generic player;
qc is the expected number of EVs that took part in the
previous rounds of the game and that the CC estimates to be at
the station upon the arrival of the generic player (this includes
the players that selected c in one of the previous rounds but
have not reached it yet);
nc is the number of player EVs selecting station c at the
present round.
The first two terms are overlined because they represent
the expected number of EVs that a generic player will find
before her in line7. Also, we remark that, since none of the
7The fact that the payoffs of our games include expected values is consistent
with the fact that deterministic utility functions can include probabilities and
expected values [31, Ch. 1].
6above quantities depends on the player identity, our definition
complies with the anonymity property of congestion games.
The price that we pay, in terms of realism, to comply with
such a property is twofold:
• the number of waiting player vehicles qc does not include
the ones of the current round, and
• utility functions cannot account for the fact that different
players may value their time differently.
As will be shown in Sec. V-B, we will be able to remove both
assumptions by switching to a CAG model.
Finally, note that the term qc represents the link between
subsequent rounds of the game, and that the wc and qc can
be acquired by the CC through the ITS, by exploiting services
similar to those currently implemented by recent navigation
solutions [2], [29]. We study the impact of errors in such an
estimation in Sec. VII.
We are now able to write ηc(nc) as shown in (2). In (2), we
assume all players to select the server with the shortest queue.
The parameters σ and ρ are the time necessary for battery
replacement and battery charging, respectively; for simplicity,
we assume them to be constant8. Also, φ and ψ represent
the (estimated) remaining fraction of, respectively, replace and
recharge time for the vehicle now being served at the selected
station.
The first and second line of (2) correspond to the case where
the generic player finds an idle server, hence its stopping time
at c coincides with the time necessary for battery replacement,
σ, if there is any fully-charged battery available, or with
the battery charge time, ρ, otherwise. The third line, instead,
represents the case where all servers are busy and the tagged
player is able to replace her battery with a fully-charged
one. The last two lines apply when the fully-charged batteries
are not enough for the vehicles waiting at the station, hence
the batteries of the vehicles arriving after the Bc-th are not
replaced but charged, in a time ρ. In particular, the different
expressions reported in the two lines account for the cases
where the available fully–charged batteries are, respectively,
more and less than the servers at the charging station.
To summarize, we report the game elements in Tab. II. As
mentioned, it has been shown in [4] that congestion games
admit at least one pure-strategy that is an NE. However, finding
the NE for one-shot games9, such as ours, is NP-hard [32]. In
order to lower the level of complexity, below we introduce a
new game, namely, a game with congestion-averse utilities.
8Considering ρ to be a constant is a fair assumption as it is conceivable that
EVs resort to the CC advice only when their battery is low; hence, differences
in the EVs battery level can be neglected.
9Equilibria for congestion games in which players subsequently make their
moves can instead be found in polynomial time [33].
Fig. 3. Abstract representation of the vehicular scenario where for each EV
there is only one possible route toward a given charging station, and from
there to its intended destination.
B. Game Model with Congestion-averse Utilities
Games with congestion-averse utilities [5] are a variant of
congestion games, where utility functions can depend upon
the identity of the player – and not only upon their decisions,
as in congestion games. As shown in [5], these games (i)
admit at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and (ii) such
equilibrium can be found in polynomial time.
Let us now consider the same scenario as above, but assume
that, for every EV-charging station pair, there exists only
one possible route to take, as depicted in Fig. 3. We stress
that, although simpler, such a model is still realistic if, for
the current strategy, the CC associates to each EV-charging
station pair the route deemed to be the fastest one, based
on its recent estimates. Indeed, such a route, dynamically
selected depending on the current road traffic status, is likely
to be the most advantageous to the EV, hence neglecting the
others will not lead to significantly worse performance. This is
also confirmed by our results derived in real-world scenarios,
shown in Sec. VII.
Under the above assumption, the system can be modeled as
a game with congestion-averse utilities (CAG), for which NEs
are pure-strategies and can be found in polynomial time [5].
The game is defined as a 4-uple similar to Γ, as in (1), however,
two main differences exist between CAGs and congestion
games:
• in CAGs, it must hold that Si = P(Fi) , ∀i ∈ N , i.e., all
partitions of Fi are possible strategies, and
• the costs of the facilities can depend on player identities.
The first difference implies that, for each player i, the
CC has to consider as viable strategies not a subset but all
possible partitions of Fi. A set F defined as in the case
of the congestion game would force the CC to consider
non-meaningful strategies where an EV stops at more than
one charging station, located either on the same route or on
different routes. In order to overcome this issue, as a first step
we redefine the set of facilities as F = C, i.e., we remove
the road segments and consider only the charging stations. It
TABLE II
COMPARING CONGESTION GAMES VS. CAGS
Players Facilities Strategies Strategy Cost
Congestion N F = C ∪ L ∀i ∈ N : Si = {{cx, l1, . . . , lm}x} s.t. cx ∈ C is reachable by i, and ηc(nc) +
∑
l τl(nl)
game {li}i=1...m ∈ L form a route from current i’s segment to dest., through cx (sum over l’s ∈ route)
CAG N F = C ∀i ∈ N : Si = {{cx}x, {cx, cy}x,y , {cx, cy, cz}x,y,z} ηc(n
(i)
c ) + τi,c
s.t. cx, cy, cz ∈ C and reachable by i; Si = {{cx}, {cy}, {cz}} (depends on player id)
7follows that the set of facilities that the generic player i can
use, Fi, is now given by just the charging stations that the
EV can reach. This is a viable choice since, per the initial
assumption in this subsection, each EV-charging station pairs
is implicitly, and univocally, associated to one route only. As
a second step, we prove the lemma below.
Lemma 1: Consider the game with congestion-averse utili-
ties introduced above, in which each facility has a cost greater
than 0. Then, in order to identify a pure-strategy NE, for any
player i ∈ N it is sufficient to examine the subset of viable
strategies Si ⊆ Si, such that each strategy in Si includes one
facility only.
Proof: Players are self-interested and aim at finding an
optimal trade-off between trip time and charge price. Recall
that costs are positive, thus selecting more than one facility
(i.e., charging station) leads to an increased overall cost. A
player will therefore always deviate from a strategy profile
that makes her use more than one facility. Thus, in order to
find an NE, it is enough to consider as viable strategies the
ones that imply the use of one facility only.
Based on the above result, we can limit our attention to the
set of strategies Si, which includes only partitions of Fi with
cardinality equal to 1, and each of them corresponding to only
one of the charging stations that EV i can reach.
Next, we leverage the second difference between CAGs
and congestion games, i.e., the fact that in CAGs utilities can
depend on the player identity. In particular, we define the cost
of a charging station c, which can be used by player i, as the
total trip time i would incur, and we write it as:
ηi,c(n
(i)
c ) + τi,c +Kipic . (4)
In (4), the first term is the sum of the delay due to the estimated
waiting time and the charging time at station c, while the
second term is the travel time through the route associated
to the EV-charging station pair (i, c). Note that all the terms
in (4) depend on the player identity i, including Ki. It follows
that, unlike the congestion game described above, the CAG
formulation can account for player-specific trade-offs between
trip time and charge price, i.e., for the fact that players may
value time differently with respect to money. Furthermore, the
following remarks hold.
(a) ηi,c(n
(i)
c ) can be obtained from (2) by replacing ρ with
ρi, and wc with
w(i)c = m
(i)
c + qc + n
(i)
c . (5)
Indeed, the recharging time ρi may be different from one
player to another, and depend on the remaining battery charge
of the EV. Also, the terms in (5) are not averaged over the
players i ∈ N , but estimated with reference to the position
and route of i, as now the CC can account for the numberm
(i)
c
of non-player EVs that it estimates to be at the station upon
the arrival of player i. Similarly, q
(i)
c + n
(i)
c is the number of
players, respectively, of the previous rounds and of the current
one, that the CC estimates to arrive at c before player i does.
(b) The travel time τi,c, associated to the EV-charging
station pair (i, c), does not depend on n
(i)
c , as it now accounts
for the vehicular traffic intensity due to all non-player vehicles
only. The impact of such an approximation is very limited
since typically the number of players, i.e., the number of EVs
with low battery that ask for advice in a time period T , is
much smaller than the number of all other vehicles traveling
over the road topology (see also the results in Sec. VII). This
approximation represents the price we have to pay for the
lower complexity of the CAG model with respect to the CG
one.
The elements of the CAG are summarized in Tab. II. By
comparing the elements above to the ones of the congestion
game (Sec. V-A), we observe three important aspects. First,
the facilities F in the CAG correspond to the charging stations,
as road segments are not taken into account. Second, in the
CAG, the sets Si of possible strategies correspond to the
possible subsets P(Fi) of reachable facilities, including the
non-viable ones like {ca, cb}. Third, such dominated strate-
gies are discarded by moving to the sets of non-dominated
solutions Si which, by Lemma 1, only includes subsets of Fi
with cardinality one.
As mentioned, in the case of CAGs, pure-strategy NEs can
be found in polynomial time [5], thus the CC can solve the
game with low complexity. Below, we evaluate the number of
strategies that the CC has to process before an NE is found
and the social utility corresponding to such an NE, i.e., how
good the NE is from the system performance viewpoint. We
also show that, in spite of its low complexity, the CAG model
approximates very well the previous scenario where multiple
routes may exist for any EV-charging station pair.
VI. SIMULATION SCENARIO
In order to show the benefits that can be obtained through
our game-theoretic approach, we use a real-world road topol-
ogy representing a 3×2 km2 section of the urban area of
Ingolstadt, Germany [34], depicted in Fig. 4. The vehicle
mobility has been synthetically generated using the SUMO
simulator [6], with a time granularity of 0.1 s. The mobility
trace is representative of 60-minute-long road traffic and of
average traffic intensity in the area. We stress that we preferred
a synthetic trace over real-world ones, e.g., taxi or bus traces,
since these only include a small portion of car traffic and the
represented vehicles have predetermined routes that cannot be
changed. Arguably, using synthetic mobility over a real topol-
ogy allows us to fine-tune such parameters as the number of
vehicles and players. The number of vehicles simultaneously
present in our road topology is a varying parameter of the
system, and the average vehicle trip time clearly depends on
such a value.
The scenario includes 6 charging stations, which are placed
on the main arteries of the road topology, as portrayed by the
red dots in Fig. 4. The number of servers at each station may
vary; namely, two stations have 2 servers, other two have 6
servers and the remaining ones have 4 and 10 servers each.
We assume that the time to replace a battery with a fully-
charged one is equal to 3 minutes, while the battery recharging
time is 20 minutes. Unless otherwise specified, we assume
that the fully-charged batteries available are enough to serve
all EVs resorting to the navigation service in a time period
8Fig. 4. Road topology: red dots highlight the six charging stations.
T . Also, unless otherwise specified, we keep charge prices
constant at pic = 10 $ per charge, and 1/Ki = 15 $/hour. The
latter figure roughly corresponds to the minimum wage in the
U.S., which could represent a lower bound for the value an EV
driver may give to her time (at least in popular culture [35]).
Without loss of generality, all vehicles are assumed to
be electric. The average number of EVs that resort to the
navigation service is a varying parameter in our simulations.
The time instant at which an EV finds itself in need of a
charged battery and asks the CC for advice is uniformly
distributed over its trip time, i.e., the time interval since the EV
enters the road topology till it leaves. Notice that in practice
this time corresponds to the moment when the battery level
is medium, rather than low, as suggested by manufacturers in
order to improve battery life.
The navigation service is provided via the cellular network,
through which an EV may issue a query to and receive a
response from the CC without significant delay. However,
alternative solutions exploiting 802.11p-based roadside units
could be considered as well. As for the CC, we consider
that information on the number of EVs currently waiting at
a charging station to be served, as well as on the traffic
conditions, is acquired and processed every 10 seconds. The
requests for the navigation service sent by the EVs are instead
processed by the CC every T = 60 s. Such an interval is
sufficiently short, so that, even if impatient, vehicles will wait
for the suggestions of the CC. Also, even if in general low
values of T imply a high correlation between game rounds,
we properly account for such a correlation in (3) and (5).
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Fig. 5. Average computational complexity vs. number of players, when they
are 20% (left) and 60% (right) of all vehicles. CAG and congestion game
(CG) are compared.
VII. RESULTS
We now show the performance that is attained through
our approach, and compare it to the results obtained when a
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Fig. 6. Average per-EV trip time as a function of the number of players,
when they represent 20% (left) and 60% (right) of all vehicles. CAG and
congestion game (CG) are compared against the optimal, for both player and
non-electric vehicles.
centralized optimization problem is solved at the CC as well
as when a greedy selection of charging station and route is
adopted. In order to derive the results in the cases where the
CC generates its advice from the solution of the CAG or of
the congestion game (labelled as CG in the plots), we proceed
as follows. Every time interval T , the CC solves the game
considering as players the EVs from which it has received a
request. To do so, the CC starts from a random strategy profile,
i.e., a random assignment of the facilities to the players. In
the case of the congestion game, it assigns both the charging
station and the corresponding route, while in the CAG, it
assigns only the charging station and associates to each player-
charging station pair the fastest route that takes the EV from
its current road segment to the station, and from there to its
destination. Player payoffs (i.e., trip times) are then computed
through SUMO in the scenario described in Sec. VI. To derive
the trip times, we assume that every non-player vehicle takes
its originally-planned route, while players will conform to the
advice of the CC, hence they will follow the suggested route.
Given the current strategy profile and player payoffs, the CC
examines other strategies according to the solution algorithm
in [5] for the CAG, and to the one in [31, Ch.7] for the con-
gestion game. For every strategy, player payoffs are computed
via SUMO as before. If a more profitable strategy is found
for any of the players (i.e., if any of the players could deviate
from the previous strategy), then the new strategy is adopted
and the whole procedure is repeated until an NE is reached.
Unless otherwise specified, we consider that the CC takes
the first NE it finds as the solution of the game. While
subsequent equilibria could in principle be better, we found
that in practical cases all the equilibria found for the CG
yielded virtually the same payoffs. Using different starting
solutions, e.g., assigning to each player the closest station or a
station at random, did not influence the quality of the solution
but only the convergence time, i.e., the number of iterations
needed to find it.
For both the CAG and the congestion game, we evaluate the
computational complexity, i.e., the number of strategies that
the CC has to examine before reaching the game solution,
which also corresponds to the number of SUMO runs. Then,
we calculate the per-player trip time associated to such a
solution. All results are averaged over 10 runs. We compare
such values with the trip time obtained through the techniques
9described below.
Optimal: the solution that the CC can obtain by minimizing
the trip time averaged over all EVs that ask for advice. This
solution in general is not an NE, thus it may not be followed
by rational drivers.
Greedy: the CC only disseminates information on the road
travel time, and on the occupancy and the charging time at sta-
tions. Based on this knowledge, each EV independently makes
its own decision by selecting the charging station and the route
that are deemed to minimize its own trip time. Note that, in
this case, the CC just informs the EVs without providing any
advice, and the EV decision is taken disregarding the presence
of other vehicles looking for a charging station.
Now, let us initially neglect the presence of non-rational
drivers and of EVs with low battery whose drivers do not use
the navigation service. Fig. 5 depicts the number of strategies
that the CC has to examine before the solution to the game
is found, for both the CAG and the congestion game (CG).
We stress that the CC returns its advice to EV drivers only
once the game solution (which is a pure-strategy NE) has been
reached, thus the computational burden is solely carried by
the CC. The two plots in the figure refer to the cases where
the average number of EVs that are low in battery and ask
for advice (i.e., players) is, respectively, 20% and 60% of the
average total number of vehicles simultaneously present in the
road topology.
As expected, the complexity of the congestion game is
always higher than that of the CAG and, in both cases, it
increases as the number of players grows. In particular, for our
range of player numbers, the CC always examines less than
4000 strategies before finding the solution in the case of the
CAG, and less than 8000 in the case of the congestion game.
We remark that one SUMO run only takes a few seconds,
hence simulation time is manageable.
The plots also provide a striking comparison between the
CAG and the congestion game. While the complexity of the
former remains remarkably low, the complexity of the latter
increases severely as the number of players grows beyond 60.
On the contrary, the total number of EVs in the road topology
has just a marginal impact on both the CAG and the congestion
game solution time. These results indicate that the CAG model
is highly scalable, hence it can be successfully applied even
to very large, crowded system scenarios.
Next, one may wonder whether the solution obtained
through the CAG is as good as the one of the congestion
game, or if the gain in complexity we have with the CAG
takes a high toll in terms of system performance. To answer
this question, in Fig. 6 we show the average vehicle trip time,
for both player and non-electric vehicles, again as the number
of players is 20% and 60% of the total number of vehicles.
The performance corresponding to the solutions of the two
games are also compared to that of the optimal solution.
The figure shows that the average trip times of player and
non-electric vehicles have the same qualitative behavior, with
the former clearly being higher than the latter since players
stop at a charging station during their trip. Also, comparing the
two plots, it can be seen that the smaller the total number of
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Fig. 7. Trip time breakdown for the CAG (top) and congestion game (bottom),
when players are 60% of the total number of vehicles.
vehicles simultaneously present in the road topology, the lower
the traffic intensity and the shorter the average per-EV trip
time. As for the comparison among the CAG, the congestion
game and the optimal, the difference in performance can be
barely noticed when the players are 20% of the total number
of EVs (left plot of Fig. 6). When the percentage of players
is large (right plot), the difference with respect to the optimal
is limited in the case of the CAG, and it is again unnoticeable
for the congestion game. This indicates that neglecting the
contribution of player EVs to the travel time makes the CAG
model less precise only when players represent the majority
of vehicles on the road topology.
Fig. 7 confirms such an observation. The figure highlights
the different contributions to the average per-player trip time,
due to the waiting time at the charging station, the service time
(which is constant) and the travel time. The results refer to
the CAG (top plot) and to the congestion game (bottom plot),
when the players are 60% of all vehicles. It can be seen that
the difference between the two game models mainly resides
in the travel time, which is higher when the CAG solution is
adopted.
Fig. 8 depicts the 10th (dashed line) and the 90th (solid
line) percentiles of the per-player trip time, when players are
20% (top) and 60% (bottom) of all vehicles. In the case of
the 10th percentile, the difference, among the solution of the
CAG, that of the congestion game and the optimal, can be
barely detected. As for the 90th percentile, it can be observed
that, when the optimal solution is adopted, a fraction of player
EVs may experience a significantly longer trip time than under
the congestion game or the CAG. This suggests that applying
the optimal solution may lead to higher unfairness in the user
10
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
Pe
r-p
la
ye
r t
rip
 ti
m
e 
[s]
Number of players, N
CAG
CG
Optimal
90th perc.
10th perc.
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
Pe
r-p
la
ye
r t
rip
 ti
m
e 
[s]
Number of players, N
CAG
CG
Optimal
90th perc.
10th perc.
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per-player trip time, vs. number of players, when they are 20% (top) and 60%
(bottom) of all vehicles.
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Fig. 9. Average per-player trip time vs. number of players, when they
represent 20% (left) and 60% (right) of all vehicles. Comparison among CAG,
congestion game, optimal, and greedy. CAG-10 indicates that the CC takes
as a solution of the game the best among the first 10 NEs it finds.
performance. Intuitively, this lack of fairness is connected to
the fact that some users will deviate from the optimal solution,
which is therefore not an equilibrium.
We now investigate the benefit of our approach with respect
to the aforementioned greedy scheme. Recall that the greedy
technique assumes the EVs to have periodically updated infor-
mation about road traffic and status of the charging stations.
In spite of this, Fig. 9 clearly shows that a greedy approach
cannot cope with the other techniques in terms of performance:
the degradation that is observed is indeed severe and becomes
exceedingly high as the number of players increases. Intu-
itively, this is due to many users selecting the (currently) least
crowded station, which suddenly becomes overloaded (as in
the well-known route-flapping effect). Fig. 9 also depicts the
performance of the CAG when the CC does not solve the game
using the first NE that is reached, but the NE that minimizes
the average per-player trip time among the first 10 it finds. In
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Fig. 10. Average trip time vs. number of EVs with low battery, when they
are 20% (top) and 60% (bottom) of all vehicles. Comparison between EVs
that resort and those that do not resort to the advice of the CC.
the plots, we label this curve by CAG-10. Interestingly, such a
simple enhancement to the solution procedure makes the CAG
approach as effective as the congestion game and the optimal,
without impairing its scalability.
In conclusion, not only modeling the system through a CAG
is a feasible, practical approach to the problem, but its solution
also leads to a performance that is remarkably close to the
optimum and much better than that attained with a greedy
scheme.
We now consider the case where not all EVs with low bat-
tery resort to the navigation service, rather they act according
to the greedy scheme. Recall that this case also represents
the behavior of non-rational EVs, i.e., EV drivers that ask
the CC for advice but they do not follow its suggestion. The
results portrayed in Fig. 10 refer to the case where there is
an equal number of rational EVs (i.e., player EVs) that ask
for advice and of EVs that instead do not resort to the CC.
The plot shows that EVs that do not exploit the navigation
service, on average, experience a higher trip time than those
that use it. Such a difference in performance is particularly
evident as the number of EVs with low battery increases. This
further confirms that our game-theoretic approach always leads
to solutions (i.e., advice from CC) that are advantageous to the
EVs, thus increasing the user satisfaction.
Next, we assume that the information the CC can acquire
through the ITS is not fully accurate. Specifically, Fig. 11
shows the effect of such inaccuracy when the waiting time at
the charging stations is affected by a random jitter, uniformly
distributed between 0 and 300 s. From the plots, we can see
that the average per-EV trip time increases, and that a longer
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Fig. 11. Inaccurate information at the CC: average per-EV trip time as a function of the number of players, when they represent 20% (left), 60% (middle)
of all vehicles and CAG is used; time breakdown for the latter case (right).
time is spent waiting at the stations. Indeed, stations that were
free might have been advertized as busy and vice versa. As
a consequence, EVs avoid free stations that are advertized as
busy, while they flock to busy stations advertized as free.
In Fig. 12, we consider that the number of charged batteries
available at the charging stations is limited, i.e., EVs may
have to wait until their own battery is charged. Fig. 12 refers
to the case where at every time period T , the number of
charged batteries available at each station is equal to twice the
number of servers at the station. We observe a sharp increase
in the average per-EV trip time as the number of player EVs
increases. More interestingly, the right plot in Fig. 12 shows
that only a fraction of such an increase is due to vehicles
waiting for their battery to be charged. Rather, vehicles find
it advantageous to travel very far away to find a station with
charged batteries available – hence the longer travel times –
and possibly waiting in line at such stations – hence the longer
waiting times.
Finally, we focus on the CAG and look at the case in
which stations have significantly different charge prices. More
specifically, such prices are uniformly distributed in [10, 50]
and Ki = K . In Fig. 13, we study the effect of the “value of
time”, 1/K , on the average trip time of player EVs. Recall that
the higher 1/K , the more EV drivers value time with respect
to money. As expected, we observe that if vehicles give more
importance to the charge price rather than to the trip time, the
latter tends to increase. Indeed, vehicles will be more willing
to wait in line at the cheapest stations, as well as to make
longer trips to reach them.
Tab. III highlights another interesting aspect: giving a higher
importance to money rather than to time significantly de-
creases the computational complexity of finding an equilib-
rium. This effect has the following intuitive explanation: trip
times depend on other players’ choices, while charge price
only depend on the station selected by each player. Therefore,
the more important price is for a player, the less likely it
is that her choice will be affected by the decisions of other
players, which only influence trip times. Fig. 14 shows the
average per-charge prices paid by the vehicles. When vehicles
only consider time (1/K = ∞), prices are very close to the
average. If price is also accounted for, we observe that (i)
prices are lower, and (ii) fewer players (hence shorter trips)
are associated to cheaper prices.
TABLE III
COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY AS A FUNCTION OF K , WHEN PLAYERS
REPRESENT 60% OF VEHICLES AND CAG IS USED
1/K = ∞ 1/K = 30$/h 1/K = 15$/h
20 350 284 124
60 3854 1425 960
100 7112 3487 2301
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
Av
er
ag
e 
pa
id
 p
ric
e 
[$]
Number of players, N
1/K=∞
1/K=30
1/K=15
Fig. 14. Average price paid by players for different values of K and as a
function of the number of players, when they represent 60% of vehicles and
CAG is used.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Leveraging the use of ITS, we envisioned the availability of
a navigation service that provides electric vehicles (EVs) that
are low in battery with advice on the charging station to use
and the route to take. We focused on how to determine such
advice so that EV drivers find it advantageous to themselves
and they are willing to follow it.
After showing that traditional optimization approaches fail
to achieve the above goal, we considered a realistic scenario
and modeled the problem as a congestion game, for which
at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists (i.e., a
solution that all EVs find satisfactory). Then, in order to lower
the complexity, we introduced a game with congestion-averse
utilities (CAG) that applies to a slightly simpler scenario but
for which an NE can be found in polynomial time. We assessed
the performance of our approach through SUMO and under a
real-world vehicular environment. The results show that using
CAGs, not only is a viable, scalable technique, but it also leads
to an average per-EV trip time that is remarkably close the
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Fig. 12. Limited number of fully-charged batteries: average per-EV trip time as a function of the number of players, when they represent 20% (left), 60%
(middle) of all vehicles and CAG is used; time breakdown for the latter case (right).
minimum that can be found through a traditional optimization
approach.
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